Australia urgently needs an integrated approach to fighting disinformation, especially that involving foreign actors. Relying on isolated regulatory measures, siloed capabilities, and disparate working groups isn’t good enough.
Australia could look to international models in balancing the need for security with the protection of fundamental freedoms. This isn’t about setting up an authority to moderate content or creating a ministry of truth. It is about upgrading our institutional architecture to ensure a coordinated, comprehensive and strategic approach that leverages collective resources and expertise, enabling Australia to effectively counter the pervasive threat of disinformation while upholding democratic values.
Disinformation erodes public trust, polarises communities and destabilises democratic processes. But it’s not new. Deploying false and manipulated information has long been recognised as a crucial tactic in modern warfare. Alongside misinformation and malinformation, these tactics are often part of broader cognitive warfare strategies that can be traced back to the 18th and 19th centuries.
Modern psychological operations sow confusion in much the same way as their forbears. But the emergence of social media and the interconnectedness of global societies have amplified reach and effect of psychological operations to unprecedented levels, presenting new challenges for governments worldwide.
In Australia, where democratic values and a free press are cornerstones of society, the stakes are high, potentially swaying the outcome of elections. Studies into voter behaviour in the United States and Italy show that online disinformation has a real-world impact and could tip electoral scales. It is only a matter of time and technology before this threat becomes so sophisticated that voters might be swayed enough to topple heads of state.
If the government wants disinformation to stop, why is it taking a fragmented approach to fighting the threat? Strategy isn’t unified, education efforts are segmented, widespread public awareness is lacking, and there’s no centralised oversight of activities spanning the information environment.
This approach is inefficient and strategically ineffective. It creates gaps—such as inconsistent messaging to the public, slow responses to critical issues, and disparities in technology adoption—that could be exploited to undermine public confidence and social cohesion.
An overlapping landscape of bodies have a disinformation mandate. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) mapped 24 federal departments and agencies with responsibilities and connections for countering cyber enabled foreign interference.
The Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce focuses on electoral disinformation; the Strengthening Democracy Taskforce works to strengthen democracy writ large; two taskforces focus on foreign interference, in which disinformation is a factor; and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade established a counter-disinformation taskforce during the Covid-19 pandemic.
There are regulators forums, the eSafety Commissioner and the Australian Communications and Media Authority, tasked with overseeing the online misinformation code of practice.
Throw into the mix Australia’s intelligence, defence and police agencies, which bring to the challenge some of the best capabilities in the world, and the landscape starts to get increasingly crowded.
To effectively counter disinformation, Australia will need a more streamlined and integrated approach that coordinates these efforts and leverages collective strength.
I’ve previously written about the centralised approaches in France, Canada and Lithuania. In response to aggressive Russian cognitive warfare, Sweden’s Psychological Defence Agency works to lift the country’s psychological defence across all levels of government. In 2023, the United States created a federal disinformation office responsible for integrating intelligence on foreign malign influence, advancing strategic analysis and overseeing election security efforts. Meanwhile, Italy has tabled an urgent bill in parliament to establish a national cognitive security agency, and the European Union has expanded its anti-disinformation centres to cover all member countries.
What these initiatives have in common is a centralised approach to disinformation, with a focus on intelligence integration, stakeholder coordination, strategic analysis and operational development, all through a national and subnational approach. Some agencies specifically focus on election safeguards, but this isn’t the only focus—because countering disinformation threats is constant, not momentary.
Some initiatives are not without challenge. Critics are quick to cite potential overreach and privacy concerns, and the EU’s efforts have been complicated by the diverse legal and cultural landscape across member states. Australia can learn from these experiences, working to balance the need for a strong, coordinated response with the protection of individual rights and freedoms.
The idea of a lead Australian agency responsible for countering disinformation is not new. The PJCIS recommended this just last year. But the government only noted the recommendation, satisfied that the existing disparate structure and multiple coordination mechanisms were sufficient to deal with the growing threat.
While experts agree there are several components of an effective disinformation strategy—including media literacy, regulation, prebunking and algorithmic transparency—none on its own is a silver bullet. What we need is a unified national strategy that brings all the elements together, and an agency with clear responsibility working under strong ethical guidelines to prevent abuses.
Information integrity is critical to democratic resilience. The next election, due in 2025, need not be a test of our disinformation preparedness, but if no changes are made to the current approach, it unfortunately may well become one. To ensure we are adequately protected in an election year and beyond, Australia must upgrade its institutional architecture. This will not only enhance our response to emerging threats but also fortify against future attempts to undermine the very fabric of Australian society.