The ousting of Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina may upset the fragile balance she established between her country and India, China and the United States. India, which has used its influence with Hasina’s government to hold down Chinese involvement in Bangladesh, may have the most to lose.
China, on the contrary, may have an opportunity to strengthen its presence on the Bay of Bengal.
Hasina’s diplomacy was characterised by a balancing act with the three major powers, allowing Bangladesh to extract maximum concessions and limit dependence and interference in its internal affairs.
Her departure on 5 August creates circumstances in which the stakes are particularly high for India, which sees China’s involvement in Bangladesh’s infrastructure projects as a threat. In 2016, New Delhi convinced Dhaka to abandon the Sonadia deep water port project China intended to build.
New Delhi also fears for the future of trans-shipment arrangements between Bangladesh and India’s northeast, which the new government in Dhaka may be tempted to revise. In this context, the ousting of Hasina is a setback.
Hasina’s return to power in 2008, with New Delhi’s support, initiated a close rapprochement between Bangladesh and India, ending Dhaka’s complacency in relation to several terrorist groups that are often supported by Pakistan. It did also open a new era of cooperation with India in trade, energy, infrastructure, defence, security and science. Under Hasina, Bangladesh moreover enforced stricter border controls to check for influxes of illegal immigrants.
India did not ignore the unpopularity of an increasingly coercive regime, but it underestimated the upsurge in opposition to the Hasina government following the January 2024 election, which was marked by an opposition boycott and an unusually low voter turnout of 40 percent. Bangladesh’s political proximity to India alienated Bangladeshis, generating an ‘India-out’ campaign in March 2024. India will need to adjust its relationship with Bangladesh.
China benefited hugely from Hasina’s tenure. However, because it has always presented a facade of political neutrality, perceptions of China in Bangladesh are predominantly positive, and China is less likely to suffer from the ousting of the regime. At the end of 2023, 700 Chinese companies operated in Bangladesh. During Hasina’s visit to Beijing in July 2024, the two countries elevated their relationship to a ‘comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership’. Defence cooperation also became an important component of the relationship. China delivered two refurbished submarines to Bangladesh, commissioned in 2023, and built the BNS Sheikh Basina submarine base in Cox’s Bazar. Today, China is Bangladesh’s most important arms supplier. China provided 73.6 percent of Bangladesh’s arms acquisitions between 2010 and 2020. Although their defence cooperation has been limited to arms sales and infrastructure building, it is increasingly operational. In May 2024, China and Bangladesh conducted their first-ever bilateral military exercise.
The military importance of China–Bangladesh cooperation should not be exaggerated. The May 2024 exercise was based on United Nations peacekeeping anti-terrorism operations. Bangladesh’s military cooperation with China still lacks the density of its cooperation with India, which involved 11 military drills between 2009 and 2023. However, the Bangladesh-China relationship does signal a proximity that would have been unthinkable a decade ago.
Recent tensions between Dhaka and Washington could serve the United States well in the transition period. Washington’s sanctions against Bangladesh’s Rapid Battalion Force—for human rights violations—and insistence that Bangladesh align with US democratic principles, are in keeping with the demands of Bangladeshi students during the recent uprising.
Dhaka had reached out to Washington to balance against India and China and get better terms from them. The US remains Bangladesh’s largest export destination, taking 14.5 percent of its exports. US arms sales to Bangladesh pale in comparison to China’s, but Washington maintains dynamic defence cooperation with Dhaka. However, the US cannot ignore the neutrality of Bangladesh’s recent Indo-Pacific strategy. Assuming the US views the current circumstances as an opportunity to push back against China’s influence in Bangladesh, it must be aware that the change of government may push Dhaka into Beijing’s welcoming arms.
Bangladesh’s future foreign policy orientation will ultimately depend on the new government’s composition. The Islamist movement, particularly the Jamaat-i-Islami, which Hasina had severely repressed, may be part of the new political set-up. This would most likely inhibit any US attempt to strengthen relations. For India, the re-emergence of the Islamist party on the Bangladesh political scene would mean the return of a pro-Pakistan government on its eastern flank, upsetting the regional strategic balance. How China would react remains unclear.