Indonesia’s president-elect Prabowo Subianto may be inclined to re-balance his country’s non-alignment strategy more towards China and away from the United States. It is too early to be sure, because he will not take office until 20 October, but recent events and Prabowo’s background hint at a possible change.

While preparing to assume office in October after the election in February, Prabowo made his first overseas visit as president-elect to China, where he positioned himself as an ‘old friend’. He then stopped by a ‘great friend’, Russian President Vladimir Putin, from whom he requested closer relations through nuclear power technology imports. It was his fourth visit to Putin in four years.

Meanwhile, Prabowo, formerly a nativist of a type that targets Chinese Indonesians, has converted over the past years to become one of their great supporters. And he has done so amid China’s large and growing economic influence in Indonesia.

If Prabowo is inclined to tilt away from Washington, he’d be extending distance that has appeared lately during the presidency of Joko Widodo (Jokowi). For example, Indonesia’s stand on the war in Ukraine has been muddled.

And Jakarta has been hostile towards Washington for its close relationship with Israel in relation to the war in Gaza. That has contrasted with the containment of Islamic outrage within Indonesia against China’s treatment of Uighurs.

Because Prabowo was subject to a visa ban by the United States until 2019, due to accusations of human rights abuses by a military unit he was linked to, he is unlikely to be as accepting of influence by Washington as past presidents.

Indonesia was the leading recipient of China’s Southeast Asian investments in 2023, attracting $7 billion. The same year also saw Chinese Premier Li Qiang confirm $22 billion in new investments in Indonesia. Meanwhile, the non-Chinese investment footprint in Indonesia is shrinking.

Chinese domination of certain Indonesian industries is notable. Indonesia has 22 percent of global reserves of nickel and accounts for 36 percent of the world’s supply of the metal. China-based companies built more than 90 percent of the nickel smelters in Indonesia.

Prabowo began his career as a paragon of nativism, reminiscent of his father-in-law, former president Suharto, who backed or tolerated pogroms and language-eradication programs. Prabowo’s conversion into a supporter of Chinese Indonesians has therefore been remarkable.

He explained that he had always loved Chinese philosophy and songs.

He’s made another switch, too, from a tough ex-special forces commander to a dove of the South China Sea, where Chinese territorial claims infringe on Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone. His change began during Jokowi’s administration, when he sided with officials who wanted to take a soft line in standing up to China’s claims.

None of this evidence should be taken too far. Prabowo is likely to be similar to Jokowi in pursuing neither permanent friends or enemies, only interests. Yet he seems more enthusiastic about considering China as a prop, rather than threat, to Indonesia’s rise.

If he does choose to shift closer to China, his strong nationalist reputation will protect him against accusations of deference. The reputation will also help satisfy a large nativist bloc that has grown frustrated by large influxes of Chinese labour and capital.

Altogether, we see hints of a shift towards China by an incoming president whose background suggests he may be inclined to make such a move and would be better positioned than other Indonesian leaders to do so.

Now we await further evidence.