It seems that espionage, specifically driven by ideology, is making a comeback—a motivation we in the West have naively considered a relic of the past, especially when directed against us. And if the Russian-born Brisbane couple charged with espionage last month were indeed motivated by ideology, their case is a troubling sign for Australia’s security.
Kira and Igor Korolev allegedly attempted a clandestine operation to funnel sensitive information to Russia by exploiting the Defence network access of Kira, a private in the army. Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Director-General Mike Burgess and Australian Federal Police Commissioner Reece Kershaw said in a joint statement: ‘Multiple countries are seeking to steal Australia’s secrets. We cannot be naive, and we cannot be complacent. Espionage is not some quaint Cold War notion; espionage damages our economy and degrades our strategic advantage. It has catastrophic real-world consequences.’
The Korolevs’ motivations are still uncertain, as is determining when, where, how, or even if they were recruited by Russian intelligence. The Russian Embassy responded by requesting written information on the pair and said the story was stoking anti-Russian paranoia.
More will be known when the Korolevs face a magistrates court on 20 September. But their alleged behaviour does have all the telltale signs of ideologically motivated espionage, or ideological spying.
A common framework used for understanding espionage motivations is MICE: money, ideology, coercion (or compromise) and ego. During the late 20th century, in the twilight and aftermath of the Cold War, M and E seemed to be the dominant motivations. Notable cases involved people with top secret access being co-opted by, or volunteering to, a foreign intelligence service and passing on sensitive information in exchange for money and gifts. The potency of this process can be compounded by a boost to the conspirator’s ego. High profile cases such as the FBI’s Robert Hanssen , arrested in 2001 after almost two decades on-and-off spying for Russian intelligence, are typical in this regard.
Ideological spying is different. It’s driven by a desire to promote, protect or support an ideology. The definition is deliberately broad, because the ideologies can be in a large range: nationalistic, political, social or religious.
Also, an espionage case may have a mix of MICE factors.
A notorious recent ideological spying case was that of Ana Montes, an analyst for the US Defense Intelligence Agency who spied for Cuba her entire career. She later claimed, ‘I felt morally obligated to help [Cuba] defend itself from our efforts to impose our values and our political system on it.’
Ideological spying is dangerous for the government and society at large. As opposed to espionage fuelled by money or ego, it can leave less of a paper trail for authorities to follow. Hiding a pile of ill-gotten goods is harder than hiding an idea. Although there might be traceable activity associated with ideology, such as meetings or travel, underlying beliefs can go for years without detection. And, because it is attached to an actor’s core beliefs, ideological espionage is one of the most potent and motivated forms of spying. If inspired by ideology, agents are often the most disciplined, effective and self-driven, as was the case with Montes and other Cuban spies within the US government.
Concerningly, ideological espionage cases seem to be trending upward globally. Preliminary research by ASPI’s Statecraft & Intelligence Centre suggests that ideology was a motivating factor in 35 of 79 espionage cases identified in western countries since 2000, or 44 percent. This is noteworthy, as within a previously published academic dataset with similar parameters spanning 1940 to 1989, ideology accounted for only 24 percent of cases. There was an intuitive sense that ideological spying against the West had dried up almost completely by the end of the 20th century, following the early successes of Soviet espionage from the 1930s to 1950s. Actually, ideological spying persists and deserves further research and attention.
Australia suffered a wave of Soviet-inspired ideological spying in the 1940s, as revealed by the US Venona counterintelligence effort and revelations from the defection in 1954 of Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov, spies who had masqueraded in Canberra as diplomats. But more recently Australia has seemingly been spared from ideological spying. Espionage cases have been venal and pathetic, exemplified by the (unrelated) cases of two Defence Intelligence Organisation officers, Jean-Phillipe Wispelaere in 1999 and Simon Lappas in 2000, neither of whom had an ideological motive. Those cases lacked complexity, sophisticated efforts to avoid detection and an inner drive and motivation. The alleged espionage by the Korolevs looks different.
Their case may prove to be a wakeup call that Australia is no longer safe from ideological spying. Kira Korolev was allegedly able to slip through vetting for a secret-level clearance, despite a clear and abiding connection to her country of birth, Russia. That included reports that she was a member of several Russian-Australian expat groups on social media. She was also able to allegedly hide her frequent trips to Russia whilst on leave from the Australian Defence Force, all the while being used literally as a poster girl for ADF recruitment. She was front and centre in two ADF recruitment campaign videos, saying ‘I can join as [an] IT specialist, because the full training is provided [by the ADF]. Every day I am administering the system making sure that … we don’t have any security breaches.’ And she ironically concluded by saying she got to ‘serve the nation that I love.’
Defence’s vetting capabilities have been criticised by commentators and by the parliamentary opposition, with Kira Korolov offered up as potentially first-hand evidence of systems and processes not being up to scratch. This alleged shortfall is compounded with the ADF’s current workforce shortage.
But Burgess has replied to these criticisms, saying ‘Vetting is not a solution that stops problems. If you meet the requirements to get a security clearance, you’ll get a security clearance, but that doesn’t mean to say the security journey stops at this point.’
The most dangerous possibility is that the Korolevs are a sign of things to come, or that there are many clandestine ideological actors in Australia. Rising global tensions, such as the war in Ukraine, conflict in Gaza and clashes in the South China Sea, are deepening ideological commitments. The Korolev case could indicate that Australia is no longer immune from this phenomenon. As Burgess says, the security journey does not stop at this point.
The government should acknowledge ideological spying as a real threat, and this acknowledgment should inform subsequent actions. This could include giving more weight to ideological factors within initial vetting processes, and more closely tracking signs of ideological concerns in continuous security screening.