A former commander of Australia’s submarine fleet once described to me the advantage of nuclear-powered submarines over conventional boats using a vivid analogy of predators.
‘If you are a Sydney householder, you probably have funnel web spiders in your backyard,’ the commander said. ‘A bite can make you very sick. However, you would fancy your chances and go out to pick up the kid’s toys at night.
‘If you knew there was a hungry panther in your backyard, you wouldn’t go out at all.’
A conventional submarine is like a funnel web spider. A nuclear-powered submarine is like the panther—a very powerful deterrent.
The importance of this advantage to Australia—and the way it serves United States interests—must be firmly in the minds of the Australian government if Donald Trump returns to the Oval Office.
While there are reasons for worry, including Trump’s transactionalism and the views of some of his likely advisers, fundamental US interests still favour the continuation of the AUKUS submarine acquisition program.
First, can Trump win? Today’s much-anticipated debate will help answer that question but, even with the repositioning of the Democrats under Kamala Harris, Trump is in a powerful position. Many Republican-controlled states have been putting in place mechanisms to deprive their opponents of their capacity to bring out all their supporters. Democrats are also hardening themselves to the prospect of Republican state legislatures to overthrow hostile outcomes.
At the last election, Biden won 51.3 percent of the popular vote to Trump’s 46.85 percent, yet the Republican advantage in the electoral college meant the result was close and came down to narrow margins in a few key states.
The Democrats will need to be further ahead this time, but no polls have put Harris in that position.
Under no circumstances will Trump go quietly.
If Harris does become President, debate over timing and whether or not we are complying with the heavy security and safety requirements that the US requires, will continue. Relevant congressional committees will continue to argue with the US Navy on US building pace and capabilities. But Joe Courtney, the ranking Democrat on the Sea Power and Projection Forces Subcommittee, is confident that by 2028 the US yards will deliver 2.33 submarines a year—the pace required to meet AUKUS targets for transfer while advancing US numbers.
A Harris administration would weigh on the side of delivering.
And Trump? Public reports have suggested the former president is likely to support the agreement, as have the majority of the Republican congressional delegation. On the other hand, figures like Elbridge Colby, a senior Defense official in Trump’s last administration touted as a possible national security adviser in a second administration, have criticised the agreement—though he has recently nuanced his position, describing himself as ‘agnostic’ on AUKUS and being careful to avoid suggesting he would support any rash withdrawal. In any event, our government and its representatives would need to work hard to guarantee support.
But beyond public commentary, we should consider fundamental US interests.
In the air and on the surface, it is becoming increasingly difficult not to be detected and therefore attacked. True, there are also increasing underwater threats, particularly from unmanned and autonomous vessels. But nuclear submarines can reposition themselves very quickly and never expose themselves to surface detection unlike conventional boats that need to ‘snort’ or take in air every few days.
Nuclear powered submarines therefore exercise substantial deterrence. Operated from Australia’s unique regional geography, they could be decisive. The Republican focus—notably that of the likes of Colby—is on the Pacific. Their pacing power is China. At least since last century, American isolationism has largely been directed against European entanglements, not against Pacific involvement.
And Australia’s land mass is critical in American strategic thinking. In the Cold War, it was largely as the focus of a southern look at potential enemy capabilities in the Eurasian land mass. Now, it is as an anchor in the Indo-Pacific. Northern airbases and the naval base in the West are vital to the US posture in the zone.
Trump would not be well disposed to a US engagement over Taiwan, though many in his congressional delegation and among his advisers insist on it. The Biden Administration, though defensive of Taiwan, has not been focussed on US pre-eminence in the region, preferring to see allies as part of a balance. Republicans still argue for pre-eminence.
Either way, our geography is seen as significant for the US capacity to operate in the Indo-Pacific.
For some, we are likely even to be seen as the last bastion, particularly if things have gone badly in the northern Pacific.
Australian operation of nuclear-powered submarines makes us a more effective ally and one that is more capable of looking after ourselves while also providing options in a full-scale conflict.
Trump is very transactional but, when it comes to the Alliance, so is Australia. Official speeches on both sides of the Pacific love a reference to shared values but in fact our values are not identical. I used to enjoy saying to American audience: ‘We like Americans, but we are not like Americans. The one word which sums up American values is “freedom”. The one word that sums up Australian values is “fairness”’.
What really counts is shared security interests, and they are substantial. Our joint facilities are critical to our mutual defence. Pine Gap is the largest US technical intelligence base.
Australia pays its own way, as we will do with AUKUS by contributing a substantial sum of money to the US build of Virginia class submarines. Our defence spending, while debated domestically, is nevertheless at a level Trump requires of his allies.
There is nothing that should make Trump hostile to AUKUS. Australia will have its work cut out in keeping Washington focussed and supportive under a second Trump administration, but the strategic realities are very much in our favour.