Wong and Marles must speak up about Chinese incursions into Japan
4 Sep 2024| and

China has recently made two provocative military incursions into Japanese territory in just a week, with a surveillance plane breaching airspace on 26 August and a survey ship entering territorial waters on 31 August.

On 5 September, Foreign Minister Penny Wong and Defence Minister Richard Marles will host their Japanese counterparts for 2+2 consultations. They should use the opportunity to call out China’s aggressive behaviour, rectifying Canberra’s tardiness and laying down a marker that such breaches of international rules will be met by a collective response.

We must not become desensitised to, nor casually dismiss, Beijing’s provocations. While Chinese survey ships and submarines have entered Japanese waters before, this was the first time that a Chinese military aircraft has violated Japan’s territorial airspace.

Unlike the disputed Senkaku Islands near Taiwan, where China sent a non-military plane in 2012, last week’s airspace violation took place in territory universally recognised as belonging to Japan, which should make it easier for Australia and other countries to condemn Beijing’s actions unreservedly.

These latest incursions follow two violations of Japanese airspace by Russian helicopters since 2022—seemingly warnings over Tokyo’s support for Ukraine. An ineffective response, including from Japan’s partners, might embolden Beijing and Moscow to push their ‘no limits’ partnership even further, such as taking greater risks in the joint military exercises that they already conduct around Japan.

Beijing’s transgressions were no accident, as the publicly available flight plan of the People’s Liberation Army aircraft showed. This fits a pattern of dangerous brinkmanship by Beijing, which included the sonar targeting of Australian navy divers from HMAS Toowoomba in 2023 and the release of flares near an Australian navy helicopter in May this year. Such acts are intended to test the resolve and solidarity of Beijing’s democratic rivals, as well as the response times of their armed forces.

As ever, Beijing’s motivations are murky. It’s possible that the Chinese leadership wanted to influence the selection process for a new Japanese prime minister later this month. Or they might have been aiming to dissuade Japan from hosting the armed forces of democratic partners, as occurred last month when an Italian aircraft carrier docked near Tokyo—part of an Indo-Pacific deployment that included the Pitch Black military exercises in Australia.

Alternatively, Beijing might be picking on Japan as part of a grander regional plan. Around the same time as these incursions, Chinese coast guard ships rammed a Philippines counterpart in the South China Sea, and the leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum were strong-armed into removing a reference to Taiwan from their joint communique.

Whatever its overarching strategy, such incursions reflect Beijing’s relentless tactical probing, which is designed to test the military, political and diplomatic responsiveness of its rivals.

Despite the leadership transition, Tokyo has made clear that China’s breaches of Japanese sovereignty are unacceptable. Australian ministers must offer their support, just as they would expect from Japan and other close partners were our territorial integrity challenged so brazenly.

Beijing will claim that this is a bilateral issue with Tokyo, best handled through quiet diplomacy behind closed doors, and that any other country that shows an interest is interfering. Sadly, Beijing’s narrative has gained traction in Southeast Asia, where elites misidentify the Philippines’ alliances and broadcasting of China’s maritime aggression on social media as the problem rather than the remedy.

Setting aside sovereignty disputes, members of the Association of South East Asian Nations should be able to agree that China’s use of force against the Philippines violates international rules, including ASEAN’s declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea, which Beijing has signed. A strong statement by Southeast Asian countries would be a powerful rebuke of Beijing and an affirmation that ASEAN stands by its principles.

Transparency is not a magic wand, but evidence shows that it helps counter Chinese bullying. For instance, the Chinese navy does not appear to have locked its radars onto Japanese targets since it was called out for doing so in 2013 by Shinzo Abe, the Japanese prime minister at the time, and other ministers.

But speaking out is most effective in company, supported by hard power. The joint statement on maritime cooperative activity between Australia, Japan, the Philippines and the US in April this year met this bar. While its language was careful, Beijing’s unlawful conduct in the South China Sea was clearly the target, and the rhetoric was backed by joint exercises and other initiatives. Such collective actions communicate that deterrence goes deeper than the US’ bilateral security treaties or the whim of whoever occupies the White House.

Solidarity is especially important between Japan and Australia, which have become allies in all but name, including borrowing language from the ANZUS treaty in an upgraded security agreement in 2022. Beyond their bilateral reciprocal access agreement that facilitates military exchanges, Australia and Japan also cooperate trilaterally with their US ally on priorities like networked air and missile defence. And Japan is front of the queue for contributing to AUKUS Pillar 2 advanced capabilities.

Therefore, it is vital that Australian and Japanese ministers unreservedly support each other when they stand side-by-side before the media tomorrow. A genuine partnership needs a common language on regional threats, from Beijing’s coercion to sabre-rattling by Pyongyang and Moscow. Good news stories about practical cooperation and the bonds between our nations matter, but effective deterrence also requires the naming and shaming of bad actors.